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Constitutional Law-MINORS' RIGHTOF PRIVACY
VERSUS PARENRIGHTOF CONTROLACCESS
TO CONTRACEPTIVES
ABSENT
PARENTAL CONSENT-T-H -u. Jones, Civil No. C 74-276 (D.
Utah, July 23, 1975).
TAL

Utah administered federal aid programs for family planning
services through the Utah Planned Parenthood Association
(UPPA). Pursuant to state regulations, UPPA was permitted to
administer contraceptive services and supplies to a minor only
with the permission of a parent or guardian.' The minor plaintiff,
who remains unnamed, applied to UPPA for contraceptives. Although her family qualified under federal aid program^,^ the
plaintiff was denied assistance when she refused to obtain parental permission. She therefore sought a declaratory order that the
state regulations violated her right of access to contraceptives
under federal statutes3 and her right of privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge federal court held that the
state regulations imposing parental consent requirements were
1. DIVISION
OF FAMILY
SERVICES,
STATEOF UTAHDEP'T OF SOCIAL
SERVICES,
UPDATED
V, FPC 120-FPC 201 (Form
DIRECTSERVICES
MANUAL
MATERIAL,
DIRECTSERVICE
SECTION
B-75-24-S, 1975) states in pertinent part:
Federal regulations authorize 90% federal matching under Medicaid for
offering, arranging, and furnishing directly, or on a contract basis, family planning services for eligible persons who desire such services. In conformance with
State Law, services to minors may be provided only with written consent of
parents using the appropriate form.
2. The programs are Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Medicaid, which are subsidized by federal funds and regulated by the Social Security Act of
1935, 49 Stat. 620 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. $ 5 601-44, 1396 (1970). For pertinent
provisions of the AFDC and Medicaid programs see note 3 infra.
3. The provision for families under the program is set out in 42 U.S.C. $ 602(a)(15)
(1970), which states in pertinent part that state plans must:
[Plrovide (A) for the development of a program, for each appropriate relative
and dependent child receiving aid under the plan . . . for preventing or reducing
the incidence of births out of wedlock and otherwise strengthening family life,
and for implementing such program by assuring that in all appropriate cases
(including minors who can be considered to be sexually active) family planning
services are offered to them and are provided promptly . . . to all individuals
voluntarily requesting such services.
The Medicaid provisions require participating states to provide "medical assistance"
to all eligible individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(8)(1970). "Medical assistance" is defined
in 42 U.S.C. $ 1396d(a) (1970):
The term "medical assistance" means payment of part or all of the costs of the
following care and services . . . .

....

(4)(C) family planning services and supplies . . . to individuals of childbearing
age (including minors who can be considered to be sexually active) who are
eligible under the State plan and who desire such services and supplies; . . .
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void because (1)under the supremacy clause they conflicted with
federal regulations that impose no such requirement, and (2)
minors have, under the constitutional right of privacy, a right of
access to contraceptives that cannot be abridged by a parental
consent requirement.

A.

Contraceptives and t h e Right of R i v a c y

The United States Supreme Court first decided whether a
state could prohibit contraceptive use by married persons in
Griswold v. C o n n e ~ t i c u tThere,
.~
the executive and medical directors of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut were fined
for violating state statutes making it a crime both to use and to
assist another in the use of contraceptive^.^ The Court held that
4. 381 US. 479 (1965).The Court twice faced but did not decide the constitutionality
of the Connecticut statute before Griswold. In Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U S . 44 (1943), the
Court found that the appellant, doctor for the potential users of the contraceptives, lacked
standing. Later, in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U S . 497 (1961), the Court found the case nonjusticiable because the appellants were suing to prevent the enforcement of the statute without
violating it and therefore failed to bring the case within the "case or controversy" requirement of the Constitution.
Griswold was the first Supreme Court case to extend the right of privacy beyond
unreasonable searches and seizures to personal activities. Roe v. Wade, 410 U S . 113
(1973) and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U S . 179 (1973), extended the right of
privacy beyond the use of contraceptives to a woman's decision to have an abortion.
Although the right of privacy has not been explicitly held to cover other activities, the
Supreme Court has indicated that this "guarantee of personal privacy" extends only to
"personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.' " Roe v. Wade, 410 U S . 113, 152, citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U S . 319, 325
(1937). The Court mentions several activities that would qualify under the standard:
marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U S . 1,12 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535,541-42 (1942); child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U S .
510, 535 (1925), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U S . 390, 399 (1923).
Some members of the Court have concluded that other activities may not be sufficiently "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" to be granted privacy protection. Justice Harlan, the first justice to recognize the marital privacy right,
explicitly excluded homosexuality, fornication, adultery, and incest from protection by
the right of privacy, "however privately practiced." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U S . 497, 552-53
(1961) (dissenting opinion). Justice Goldberg, concurring in Griswold and joined by Chief
Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, quoted Justice Harlan's language and likewise excluded "sexual promiscuity or misconduct" from protection. 381 U S . 479, 498-99 (1965)
(concurring opinion). Their position was undercut somewhat by Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972). Though Eisenstadt was decided technically on equal protection grounds,
note 10 and accompanying text infra, the case did inferentially grant some protection to
extramarital sexual activities by striking down prohibitions on an unmarried person's
right to use contraceptives.
5. The Connecticut statute was a fairly unusual one, proscribing use rather than
regulating distribution and sale. CONN.GEN. STAT.REV.§ 53-32 (1958) (repealed 1969);
381 U S . a t 485.
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the prohibition of use was an unconstitutional abridgment of the
right of "privacy surrounding the marriage relationship" emanating from the "penumbras" of "specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights."' Despite the sweeping rationale of the case, the holding
was narrow: as to married persons, there can be no wholesale
prohibition against use. The Court expressly stated that it struck
down only laws prohibiting the "use of contraceptives rather than
[laws] regulating their manufacture and sale . . . ."' Thus, it
appears that a state may restrict access to contraceptives through
laws validly designed to regulate their sale.
The right recognized in Griswold was extended to unmarried
persons in Eisenstadt v. Baird.8 When he exhibited contraceptive
articles and distributed a package of vaginal foam to a young
adult unmarried woman, a college lecturer was convicted under
a Massachusetts law that prohibited any unauthorized persons
from distributing or selling contraceptive devices and that further
restricted distribution by authorized dispensers to married pers o n ~The
. ~ Court struck down the statute because, "by providing
dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who are
similarly situated, [the provisions of the statute] violate the
Equal Protection Clause."l0 While inferentially granting unmarried persons the right to use contraceptives, the Court again did
not grant an unqualified right to obtain them, since it refused to
say whether laws regulating distribution of contraceptives either
to married or unmarried persons were permissible.ll Concurring
and dissenting opinions both expressed the view that a state
could restrict the distribution of contraceptives for precautionary
health measures.12
In another case involving the same statute, Poe u. Ullman, Justice Harlan, dissenting
in the dismissal, stated:
[C]onclusive in my view, is the utter novelty of this enactment. Although the
Federal Government and many states have at one time or other had on their
books statutes forbidding or regulating the distribution of contraceptives, none,
so far as I can find, has made the use of contraceptives a crime.
367 U.S. 497, 554 (1961) (emphasis in original).
6. 381 U.S.at 484-86.
7. Id. a t 485 (emphasis by the Court).
8. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
9. MASS.GEN.LAWSANN.ch. 272, 66 21, 21A (1970).
10. 405 U.S. at 454-55.
11. Id. a t 453-54.
12. Id. a t 460, 465 (White, J., concurring; Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice White
differentiated between sections 21 and 21A of the Massachusetts General Laws (1970)
(21A excepts from prosecution registered physicians and pharmacists who dispense the
same materials to married persons) and found no problem with Massachusetts' "legiti-
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The leading abortion case, Roe v. Wade,I3 may provide the
logical nexus permitting extension of the right of privacy protections to the area of contraceptive access.14 In Roe, the state was
required to show a compelling interest for regulating a pregnant
woman's procurement of an abortion.15 Since it would arguably
mate interest in preventing the distribution of articles designed to prevent conception
which may have undesirable, if not dangerous, physical consequences." Id. a t 463, quoting
Commonwealth v. Baird, 355 Mass. 746, 753, 247 N.E.2d 574, 578 (1969). The petitioner
in this case had merely distributed harmless contraceptive foam. Justice White further
stated:
Had Baird distributed a supply of the so-called "pill," I would sustain his
conviction under this statute. Requiring a prescription to obtain potentially
dangerous contraceptive material may place a substantial burden upon the right
recognized in Griswold, but that burden is justified by a strong state interest
and does not, as did t h e statute a t issue in Griswold, sweep unnecessarily
broadly or seek "to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive
impact upon" a protected relationship.
Id. a t 463 (footnotes omitted). Chief Justice Burger likewise stated:
The choice of means of birth control, although a highly personal matter, is also
a health matter in a very real sense, and I see nothing arbitrary in a requirement
of medical supervision.
Id. a t 470.
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); accord, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
14. Roe granted a broad-based privacy right. As contrasted with Griswold, which a t
least tied the right to "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights, Roe rested its decision on the
privacy right alone. 410 U S . a t 152-54. For a discussion of Roe's impact on the privacy
doctrine see The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV.L. REV. 55, 82-83 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as The Supreme Court, 1972 Term].
Roe has provoked the outcry among many scholars that that decision (along with
Griswold) represents a return to the discredited doctrine of "substantive due process"
embodied in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and subsequently discarded by the
Supreme Court beginning with West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) and
culminating in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
For criticisms of the decision see, e.g., Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 174-77 (arguing that, as in Lochner, the Court will have to "examine the
legislative policies and pass on the wisdom of these policies in the very process of deciding
whether a particular state interest is 'compelling' "); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALEL.J. 920 (1973) (arguing that Roe is of the Lochner
tradition, but even less defensible); Note, The Abortion Cases: A Return to Lochner, or a
New Substantive Due Process?, 37 ALB. L. REV.776 (1973).
For defenses see, e.g., Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN.L.
REV.703 (1975) (arguing that the Supreme Court is not limited t o interpretation only of
the written text of the Constitution, but may also enforce "principles of liberty and justice
when the normative content of those principles" is not within the Constitution); Heymann
& Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 BOST.UNIV.L. REV.
765 (1973) (defending both the decision and its approach); Tribe, The Supreme Court,
1973 Term-Foreward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87
HARV.L. REV. 1 (1973) (granting that Roe is a return to substantive due process but
defending its approach as allocating the role of choice to the individual).
15. 410 U.S. a t 162-64. The Court noted that "a state may properly assert interests
in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential
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be inconsistent to grant right of privacy protection to a woman's
decision to terminate a pregnancy while a t the same time allowing the state to control her decision whether or not to become
pregnant, the state may yet be required to show a compelling
state interest in its regulation of access to contraceptives.16
Should this reading of Roe be adopted, however, it appears that
it would not ultimately resolve the issues raised by the instant
case. First, neither Griswold, Eisenstadt, nor Roe deals with the
extent of a state's power over minors.'' Second, even assuming
that a compelling state interest test were applied to regulation of
minors' access to contraceptives, that test may be easier to satisfy
in the regulation of a minor's-as opposed t o an adult'sactivities.18

B. Parental Rights
Historically, parents' rights to raise and train their children
have been granted a status approaching, if not achieving, fundamentality. Consequently, the Supreme Court has carefully scrutinized state efforts to curtail parental rights. In Prince u.
M a s s a c h u ~ e t t sthe
, ~ ~Court articulated the deference due parental
rights in these terms:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. And it is in recognition of this that these
decisions have respected the private realm of family life which
the state cannot enter.20
life" in the second and third trimesters of pregnancy. Id. a t 154. As to the third trimester,
the Court gave the state expansive powers: "If the state is interested in protecting fetal
life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when
it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother." Id. a t 163-64.
16. This view is urged by Note, Parental Consent Requirements and Privacy Rights
of Minors: The Contraceptive Controversy, 88 HARV.L. REV. 1001, 1006-07 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Privacy Rights of Minors], and suggested by The Supreme Court,
1972 Term, supra note 14, a t 82-83 and Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for
Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV.670, 706 n.221 (1973).
17. The Court in Roe reserved the issue as to minors. 410 U.S. at 165 n.67. For a
discussion on the applicability of privacy rights to minors in an abortion context see Note,
Privacy Rights of Minors, supra note 16, a t 1006-11; Note, The Minor's Right to Abortion
and the Requirement of Parental Consent, 60 VA. L. REV.305 (1974).
18. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Oregon, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), note 42 infra, Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), text accompanying notes 59-64, 79-85 infra.
19. 321 US. 158 (1944).
20. Id. a t 166 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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Although the state's interest prevailed in P r i n ~ e ,the
~ ' courts
have required other state interests, such as compulsory education, to yield to parental rights. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,22
the Court struck down an Oregon law that attached criminal
sanctions to parental refusal to send normal children between the
ages of 8 and 16 to public schools. The law was held to be an
unreasonable interference "with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control."23
In a more contemporary context, Wisconsin v. YoderU reaffirmed the fundamentality of parental rights. Although technically decided on free exercise of religion grounds,25Yoder sustained the rights of Amish parents to withhold their children from
21. The Court disallowed the Jehovah's Witness parents from having their children
sell religious magazines on the street as against the state's legitimate interest in prohibiting child labor. Id. a t 168-70. But see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), text
accompanying notes 24-27 infra.
For purposes of this discussion, the language of Prince is more important than the
holding, because the holding does not directly apply. Prince involved two important
rights-the state interest in regulating child labor and the parents' right to direct the
child-which were balanced against each other. But in the instant case both state and
parental rights are allied against a minor's right to privacy. Prince does illustrate, however, the deference due parental rights even when balanced against a legitimate state
interest.
Also, while Prince allowed the state to encroach upon parents' rights for the child's
protection, it cannot be read as an expansion of minors' rights. Since the "power of the
state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of authority over adults,"
the state was allowed to curtail the minor's claim of free exercise of religion for what the
state deemed to be the minor's own protection. 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
22. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). In addition, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923),
which, despite a conflict with state law, upheld a teacher's right to instruct a child in a
foreign language. The Pierce and Meyer decisions have since been cited in support of
parental rights and marital privacy. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) and
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,213,232-33 (1972) (citing both cases for parental authority in child rearing and education); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)
(parental authority in a marital privacy case).
The Meyer Court noted that although "liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment
had not been given precise definition, certain freedoms included therein were capable of
precise statement:
Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to many, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized a t common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
262 U.S. a t 399 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
23. 268 U.S. a t 534-35.
24. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
25. Id. a t 213-15. See generally Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, and the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 213 (1973).
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school beyond the eighth grade. The Court declared that the parents' duty to prepare the child for "additional obligations" includes "the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and
elements of good citizenship. "26 In this context, the Court viewed
the Pierce case "as a charter of the rights of parents to direct the
religious upbringing of their ~hildren."~'
The status of parental rights, of course, determines the constitutional test applied when those rights are limited and the
limitation is subsequently challenged. Since fundamental rights
may be curtailed only by a compelling state interest,28the question arises whether parental rights are accorded funda'mentality.
In Stanley v. I l l i n ~ i s the
, ~ ~ Court upheld a father's right to his
illegitimate children, stating that a parent's "private interest" in
his children must be protected, "absent a powerful countervailing
interest."30 Other members of the Court would apply a stricter
test. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Poe v. Ullman,31declared that
"the integrity [of family life] is something so fundamental that
it has been found to draw to its protection the principles of more
than one explicitly granted Constitutional right."32 In Griswold,
Justice Goldberg said that the "rights to marital privacy and to
marry and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as
~ ~appears,
the fundamental rights specifically ~ r o t e c t e d . " It
therefore, that a state may curtail parental rights only to further,
a t least, a "powerful countervailing interest," if not a compelling
one.
C. Minors' Rights and the Question of Capacity
At common law, minors had very few legal rights apart from
26. 406 U.S. a t 233.
27. Id. a t 233-34.
28. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U S . 113, 154-55 (1973); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 406 (1963).
29. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
30. Id. a t 651.
31. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). Justice Harlan dissented from the majority's decision to
dismiss the case on grounds of nonjusticiability. In that extensive dissent, he also took
the opportunity to expound his views on the right of privacy. As such, his comments
quoted in the text above do not necessarily constitute a minority view on the right of
privacy issue. In fact, right of privacy protection was finally granted against the same
Connecticut statute in Griswold u. Connecticut, decided 4 years later. Justice Harlan,
concurring in Griswold, reaffirmed his stance taken in Poe v. Ullman.
32. Id. a t 551-52 (Harlan, J., dissenting), cited in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
33. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U S . 479, 495 (concurring opinion).
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their families.34The underlying, if not explicit, justification for
denying children the legal ability to act on their own was-and
continues to be-the need to protect them from their own incapa~ity.~"
In the areas of health care36and contract^,^' for example,
there is a presumption of incapacity except for certain narrowly
applied exceptions. The doctrine of informed consent, long a prerequisite of a physician's right to treat his .patient,38is an apt
34. See Katz, Schroeder & Sidman, Emancipating Our Children-Coming of Legal
Age in America, 7 FAMILY
L.Q. 211, 212-14 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Katz]. Children
were treated more as servants than as individuals with separate rights. See generally
Kleinfield, The Balance of Power Between Infants, Their Parents and the State, 4 FAMILY
L.Q. 320 (1970).
35. See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 798,803 (W.D.S.C. 1961), wherein
the court states:
At common law infants do not possess the power to exercise the same legal
rights as adults. The disabilities of infants are really privileges, which the law
gives them, and which they may exercise for their own benefit, the object of the
law being to secure infants from damaging themselves or their property by their
own improvident acts or prevent them from being imposed on by others. The
rights of infants must be protected by the court, while adults must protect their
own rights. . . . Minority . . . is in itself a recognized badge of incompetency
of an infant to handle his own affairs.
Capacity in legal terms is more generally thought to be emotional or judgmental,
rather than physical, capacity. Physical incapacity is a limit in itself, without the necessity of legally imposed limits. An adult paraplegic, or one afflicted with a physically
debilitating disease such as multiple sclerosis, is not precluded from acting as any other
mentally normal adult, and may, in some circumstances, be granted license to participate
in activities with physical counterparts, such as driving. On the other hand, a 13-yearold child may be physically able to drive a car yet is denied a license because of his
presumed judgmental incapacity.
The emotional maturity factor involves more than the simple power of cognition. This
cognitive power is basically established by age 16. See Elkin, Egocentrism in Adolescence,
38 CHILDDEVELOPMENT
1025, 1032 (1967). But judgmental skill and emotional maturity
necessary to sort out complex moral variables are largely functions of age and experience.
See A. KAY,MORAL
DEVELOPMENT
179-83 (1968).
OF TORTS
$ 892, comment e (1939). See generally Stem, Medical
36. See RESTATEMENT
Treatment and the Teenager: The Need for Parental Consent, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV.1 , 4
(1973); Wadlington, Minors and Health Care: The Age of Consent, 11OSGOODE
HALLL.J.
115 (1973);Privacy Rights of Minors, supra note 16, a t 1001-05; Note, Minors and Contraceptives: The Physician's Right to Assist Unmarried Minors in California, 23 HASTINGS
L.J. 1486 (1972).
37. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS
$4 18, 18B (1973); 2 S. WILLISTON,
$9 222-48 (3d ed. 1959); cf. UTAHCODEANN.15-2-1to -4 (1953) (specifying age
CONTRACTS
of majority and providing for rescission of contracts by minors).
38. See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y.Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125,105 N.E.92 (1914).
A doctor who performs services upon a patient without his informed consent has technically committed a battery. See Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941). But
see Pilpel, Minor's Right to Medical Care, 36 ALB.L. REV. 462, 466 (1972), noting that
while doctors remain fearful of the consequences of treating minors without parental
consent, no case has been found where liability was imposed on a physician treating a
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illustration. A minor is presumed incapable of giving informed
his
consent unless the circumstances show his e m a n c i ~ a t i o nor~ ~
status as a "mature minor."40 Both the emancipation and "mature minor" exceptions rebut the presumption of incapacity. Voting provides a further illustration of the operation of the incapacity concept. Although it constitutes a fundamental constitutional
right,41children may properly be denied the right to vote." Restrictions on exercise of certain constitutional rights43as well as
on certain other activities such as driving, drinking, and marrying44are also premised on the incapacity concept.
Although in recent years much sentiment has been marshalled for the extension of children's rights," the cases viewed
minor over 15 without parental consent.
39. See, e.g., Smith v. Seibly, 72 Wash. 2d 16, 21, 431 P.2d 719, 723 (1967) (married
18-year-old considered capable of consenting to vasectomy).
40. See, e.g., Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc., 205 Kan. 292,
469 P.2d 330 (1970) (17-year-old girl found sufficiently able to understand and comprehend nature and consequences of skin graft, and therefore parental consent unnecessary).
In addition to the mature minor and emancipated minor exceptions to the informed
consent doctrine, "emergency" constitutes a third exception to the informed consent rule.
See, e.g., Wells v. McGehee, 39 So. 2d 196, 202 (La. App. 1949) (doctor released from
liability for death of child incurred in treatment without the parent's consent because
immediate action necessary for preservation of health of the child); Luka v. Lowrie, 171
Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912) (amputation performed without consent on comatose
patient justified as necessary to save life); Sullivan v. Montgomery, 155 Misc. 448, 279
N.Y.S. 575, 577-78 (N.Y .C. Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1935) (administration of anesthesia
with minor's but without parent's consent justified under emergency conditions). The
question of a minor's capacity, however, is generally irrelevant to the emergency exception.
41. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 662, 667, 670 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U S . 533,
554-55 (1964).
42. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U S . 112 (1970) (no majority opinion), the Supreme
Court sustained the law reducing the age a t which persons may vote in a national election
from 21 to 18, but allowed states to maintain higher age limits for local elections.
43. In First Amendment areas, for instance, American courts have allowed differential treatment of children and adults:
The world of children is not strictly part of the adult realm of free expression.
The factor of immaturity, and perhaps other considerations, impose different
rules. Without attempting here to formulate the principles relevant to freedom
of expression for children, it suffices to say that regulations of communication
addressed to them need not conform to the requirements of the first amendment
in the same way applicable to adults.
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 n.6 (1968), quoting Emerson, Toward a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALEL.J. 866, 939 (1963). But see Tinker v. Des
Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969), notes 53-58 infra.
44. See, e.g., UTAHCODEANN. 8 30-1-2 (1969) (requiring parental consent for minors
to marry).
L.Q. 343 (1972);
45. See, e.g., Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAMILY
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as extending children's rights seem not to disturb the basic presumption of incapacity. The courts in those cases either presumed incapacity or deemed the concept irrelevant to resolution
of the issues. Children's criminal rights cases provide one exam~"
granted chilple. The landmark decision, In Re G ~ u l t ,explicitly
dren rights not recognized before, including rights to notice of
charges, hearing, counsel, confrontation of witnesses, and the
privilege against self-incrimination."' In the process of granting
these rights, however, the Court acknowledged the minor's inherent incapacity. The abysmal lack of due process in Gault's and
other minors' cases48 convinced the Court that if adults are
granted certain procedural safeguards, a fortiori children, because of limitations due to their age (that is, their in~apacity),"~
should likewise be protected. Realizing that "admissions and confessions of juveniles require special caution"50as to reliability and
voluntariness, and that "special problems may arise with respect
to waiver of the privilege [against self-incrimination] by or on
Forer, Rights of Children: The Legal Vacuum, 55 A.B.A.J. 1152 (1969); Katz, supra note
34.
46. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
47. Id. a t 31-57.
48. The creation of a separate criminal system for children was motivated by a desire
to rehabilitate the child through nonadversary means rather than through criminal strictures. At the same time, a notion of longstanding currency that children are entitled "not
to liberty but to custody," 367 U.S. a t 17, gave a great deal of discretion to juvenile court
officials and led inevitably to abuses. Justice Fortas stated the problem in Gault:
[Tlhe highest motives and most enlightened impulses led to a peculiar system
for juveniles, unknown t o our law in any comparable context. . . . [Tlhe results have not been entirely satisfactory. Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.
Id. a t 17-18.
In another children's criminal rights case, Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555
(1966), the Court stated that "studies and critiques of recent years raise serious questions
as to whether actual performance measures well enough against theoretical purpose to
make tolerable the immunity of the process from the reach of Constitutional guarantees
applicable to adults." See generally Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary
System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 WIS. L. REV.7.
49. The problems of minors placed in a criminal setting drew this comment from
Justice Douglas:
Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy . . . . He cannot be judged by the
more exacting standards of maturity. That which would leave a man cold and
unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens. This is the
period of great instability which the crisis of adolescence produces.
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600 (1948), quoted in In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45-46
(196q).
50. 387 U.S. a t 45.
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behalf of ~hildren,"~'
the Court accorded to juveniles the "adult"
rights listed above.52
Tinker v. Des Moines School Districta is representative of
another line of cases, dealing with students in public school systems, considered to have expanded children's righks4The Court,
without mentioning the incapacity concept, upheld the right of
students to wear armbands in opposition to the Vietnam war as
an exercise of their First Amendment rights: "Students . . . are
'persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State."55 Failure to
mention the question of capacity in Tinker and other similar
cases may stem from either of two assumptions. First, minors
possess the requisite capacity,56 or perhaps more accurately, a
51. Id. a t 55.
52. Many commentators have used and abused the language and holdings of children's rights cases such as Gault. Care must be taken, however, to determine what Gault
did and did not hold. The Court's granting of significant rights and its broad dictum that
"neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone," 367 U.S.
a t 13, must be qualified by the fact that the minor has not been accorded rights explicitly
granted in the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., McKiever v. Pennsylvania, 403 U S . 528 (1971)
(trial by jury); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (bail, indictment by grand jury,
speedy and public trial).
While the Court in Kent u. United States recognized the possibility of the juvenile's
being shortchanged in terms of both procedural safeguards and treatment, constitutional
guarantees were nevertheless withheld:
[Tlhere may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.
This concern, however, does not induce us . . . to rule that constitutional
guarantees which would be applicable to adults charged with the serious offenses for which Kent was tried must be applied in juvenile proceedings . . . .
383 U.S. a t 556. This treatment reflects the fact that, notwithstanding Gault, juvenile
proceedings continue to be civil and not criminal in nature.
53. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
54. Other key cases involving extension or recognition of children's rights occur in the
same context. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (due process rights afforded
student facing temporary suspension from school); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (equal protection extended to Black children); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (allowing a student to refuse to recite the Pledge of Allegiance).
55. 393 U.S. a t 511.
56. See Priuacy Rights of Minors, supra note 16, a t 1009. But see Justice Stewart's
concurrence in Tinker:
[I] cannot share the Court's uncritical assumption that, school discipline aside,
the First Amendment rights of children are co-extensive with those of adults
. . . . "[A] State may permissibly determine that, a t least in some precisely
delineated areas, a child-like someone in a captive audience-is not possessed
of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of the First
Amendment guarantees."
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child's capacity, though limited, is adequate to the symbolic expression of political views. Second, even though the child lacks
capacity, the unique nature of the child's situation in the public
school system demands free expression nonetheless. The Supreme Court has indicated its apprehension that students may
become, through state efforts to mold "the free mind a t its
source,"57 "closed circuit recipients of only that which the State
chooses to communicate. "5s
Because of the child's presumed incapacity, the state and the
parent have been placed in commanding positions as protectors
, ~ example,
~
upheld New
of children. Ginsberg v. New Y ~ r k for
York's right to curtail sales of pornographic literature to persons
under 17 because of the material's allegedly harmful impact upon
minors. The state's rationale, that minors' contact with pornography "impair[s] the ethical and moral development of our
assumed the minor's inability to handle explicit sexual
material. The Court accepted that assumption and did not recontent that
quire "scientifically certain criteria of legi~lation,"~~
if the assumption had not been demonstrated at least it had not
been disproved.62Further, unlike cases dealing with the First
Amendment rights of adults, where only a compelling state interest may justify abridgment, Gins berg required only that the legisIn deferring to the state, the
lature's purpose be "not irrati~nal."'~
Court "recognized that even where there is an invasion of protected freedoms, 'the power of the state to control the conduct of
children reaches beyond the scope of authority over adults
. . . . ,964
7

393 U.S. a t 515, quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
57. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
58. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
59. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). See also Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728,
731-32, 738 (1970) (protection of minors part of policy considerations underlying law
allowing a householder to prevent objectionable material from being mailed to his home).
60. Id. a t 641.
61. Id. a t 642-43, quoting Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911).
62. 390 U.S. at 642, citing Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 S.
CT. REV.7, 75.
63. Id. a t 641.
64. Id. a t 638, quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944). This differential treatment appears justified by the fact that "[clhildren have a very special place
in the law which law should reflect. Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily
lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination of a State's duty
toward children." May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528,536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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The court granted the minor plaintiff the right of access to
contraceptives on two bases. First, since the Utah regulations
explicitly required parental consent before minors could procure
contraceptives from the UPPA, the state engrafted a condition of
eligibility not required by the governing federal statutes and regulations. The state regulations, therefore, conflicted with the federal scheme and were required to give way under the supremacy
clause? Second, the condition of parental consent placed an impermissible burden on the minor's constitutional right of privacy? The court relied on Roe u. Wade6' to find that the right of
65. T -H -v. Jones, Civil No. C 74-276 (D. Utah, July 23, 1975), at 10. The
dissent argued that there was no conflict with federal statutes, placing emphasis on the
phrases "in all appropriate cases," 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(15) (1970) and "who are eligible
under the State plan," 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(C) (1970) as showing the extent of the
discretion given the state plan. Jones, supra, dissent a t 2-3. The dissent also pointed to
the federal regulations denoting the family, not merely the individual members of the
family, as having the right to accept or reject such plans, 45 C.F.R. § 220.16(c) (1974).
Jones, supra, dissent a t 3-4. Finally, the dissent quoted 42 U.S.C. 8 601 (1970), which
states the objective of the act:
[T]o help maintain and strengthen family life and to help such parents or
relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care
and protection . . . .
Id. a t 6 (emphasis by the dissent).
66. Only a handful of cases have yet treated the issue of the minor's right of privacy.
Only one other case besides the instant case has been found where the court treats the
issue of the minor's right of access to contraceptives via the right of privacy. Population
Services Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) was decided approximately 2
weeks prior to Jones. In Population Services, although not concerned with the parental
consent requirement, the court granted injunctive relief against a New York law which
prohibited the sale or distribution of contraceptives to children under 16 by one other than
a licensed pharmacist and disallowed the advertisement of contraceptive devices. The
court held that the statute infringed on the right of privacy and enjoined enforcement of
the provision prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to persons under the age of 16.
Although Population Services granted the minor the right of access to contraceptives,
that decision differed from the instant case in several ways. First, unlike Jones, the state
asserted no interest in enforcing the parental right. Second, the decision referred only to
non-prescription contraceptive devices, id. at 325, whereas in Jones no such distinction
was made. Third, despite the holding invalidating the law as "overly restrictive," id. at
336, the court recognized countervailing state interests, even though not asserted by the
state:
The State may well have legitimate interests, not asserted in this action, e.g.,
promoting quality control and sanitary delivery of these products, or protecting
the health and safety of those citizens who use them, which would be substantially furthered by other limitations on distribution.
Id. The court therefore stayed the injunction against enforcement of the law for 120 days,
to "give the state legislature opportunity to enact narrower provisions, if it chooses to,
which reflect appropriate constitutional concerns, without depriving the State of all legis-
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privacy protecting the right to an abortion likewise assured an
adult the right of access to contraceptives: "If, as Roe teaches, the
fourteenth amendment protects a woman's right to decide
whether she will terminate her pregnancy, it must also, we believe, protect her right to take measures to guard against pregn a n ~ y . "The
~ ~ Supreme Court's recognition, however, that a
"state may legitimately curtail the rights of children where it
protects them from their own incapacity to fend for themselves,"6gnecessitated that the requisite capacity be found before
this same right could be extended to minors. The court found that
adequate protections already existed to protect minors from their
own incapacity in the fact that the family aid program provided
for the presence of trained personnel to advise children in the use
of birth control devices. Further, in view of the multifaceted problems facing an unwed teenage mother, no "developmental differences" distinguished minors and adults so a s to render the right
of access less important to minors. The incapacity concept therefore could not prevent extension to minors of a right of access to
contraceptives.
The court did not find the interests advanced by the state
sufficiently compelling to curtail the minor's right. The state interest in protecting the minor from the effects of actions inimical
to the mores of society was deemed inadequate to sustain the
restrictions embodied in the regulations since those restrictions
affected only poor families qualifying for federal aid. The state's
failure to apply the requirements equally to affluent minors undercut its claim of a compelling interest.'O
The court, without elaboration, dismissed the state's interest
in enforcing parental prerogatives. Those prerogatives "are entilation in this area in the interim while such measures are considered." Id. a t 340-41. In
Jones, no such countervailing interests are recognized, and the state is given no chance
to enact narrower provisions which the court would permit.
The Utah Supreme Court confronted an essentially identical fact situation in Doe v.
Utah Planned Parenthood Ass'n, 29 Utah 2d 356, 510 P.2d 75, stay denied, 413 U.S. 917
(1973). The Utah Supreme Court rejected the equal protection argument advanced by the
plaintiff, stating that a denial of contraceptives "to single minor children is not a denial
of the equal protection of the law, as they are not in the same class with married people."
Id. a t 359, 510 P.2d a t 76. The court did not treat,the privacy issue.
Several other courts have granted the right to an abortion without parental consent
to minors. See, e.g., Foe v. Vanderhoof, 389 F. Supp. 947 (D. Colo. 1973); Coe v. Gerstein,
376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1973), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 279 (1974); Doe v. Rampton,
366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973); State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975).
67. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See notes 13-16 and accompanying text supra.
68. Jones, supra a t 11.
69. Id. at 11-12.
70. See note 95 infra.
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tled to considerable legal deferenceW7lbut nevertheless must, in
some circumstances, give way to valid state interests. In the same
manner, "the state's interest in enforcing parental prerogatives
must yield to the fundamental rights of minors." Consequently,
"the state may not enforce the choice of parents in conflict with
a minor's constitutional right of free access to birth control information and devices. "72

This case note does not analyze the court's treatment and
resolution of the supremacy clause issue. Rather, it focuses on the
second rationale for the court's decision: the constitutional right
of privacy protects a minor's right of access to contraceptives. In
this context, the case note examines the court's creation of that
right in light of traditional concepts of capacity. Further, it analyzes the intersection of the minor's purported right with parental
rights of control and state interests in enforcing parental prerogatives.
This restriction of the scope of the analysis appears justified
by the fact that the instant case undoubtedly extended constitutional concepts of privacy while a t the same time significantly
undermining traditional concepts of incapacity and parental
rights. To reach its holding, the court (1)granted to adults an
unprecedented right of access to contraceptives on the strength
of Roe v. Wade; ( 2 ) found that minors have the requisite capacity
to share that right coequally with adults; and (3) secured the
primacy of the minor's right without seriously balancing it
against either the parents' right of control or the state's interest
in enforcing parental control. The first aspect of the court's decision-use of Roe v. Wade to grant adults the right of access to
contraceptives-is not challenged here, although the court
unquestionably enlarged the individual's right of access.73The
71. Id. a t 14.
72. Id. a t 15.
73. The court admitted this point:
The Supreme Court has never determined whether the Constitutional right
of privacy developed in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, and succeeding
cases includes the right to obtain family planning services and materials free
from unjustified government interference. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
the Court expressly refused to decide whether individuals have a right of access
to contraceptives.
Jones, supra a t 10. See also notes 4-12 and accompanying text supra.
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court's use-or arguably, abuse-of principles of incapacity, however, merits critical examination.

A.

The Court$ Treatment of Minors' Incapacity

To assume that Roe can be fairly read to grant to adults a
right of access to contraceptives does not resolve whether the
same right must be extended to children. Prior to that determination, a court must find, as the majority in the instant case recognized, the requisite capacity.
The court's failure to define what it meant by "capacity"
creates a troublesome ambivalence in the instant case. On the
one hand, the court's statement that the minor's "incapacity to
fend for himself' is remedied by the presence of trained personnel
suggests precisely that the minor does not possess the requisite
capacity. By relying on the presence of social workers in the family assistance program to rebut the incapacity argument raised by
the state, the court in effect recognized that children are incapable of making the contraception decision without adult guidance.
In other words, rather than establishing capacity, and hence a
basis for the extension of a right of access, the court concedes,
perhaps unwittingly, the absence of that requisite capacity.
There appears, therefore, under this aspect of the court's own
approach, no valid reason for disregarding the limitations that
the incapacity concept has traditionally imposed on minors'
rights.
On the other hand, the second argument raised by the court
to resolve the incapacity issue-that "no developmental differences" distinguish minors from adults-confuses capacity with
need. This approach assumes that reproductive ability coincides
with the judgmental maturity necessary to sustain a right of access to contraceptives. Although this approach presents a simple
administrative solution,74it is doubtful whether the approach's
underlying assumption can withstand challenge. The fact that a
9-year-old may be physically capable of operating an automobile
does not in itself justify granting him a license, absent some
analysis of his judgmental powers. It is likewise erroneous to assume that physical capacity to reproduce necessarily brings the
74. This is the solution to the age requirement used by State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d
901, 911, 530 P.2d 260, 267 (1975), in which the Washington Supreme Court upheld an
unmarried minor's right to obtain an abortion without parental consent. In considering
the age of consent, the court stated: "The age of fertility provides a practical minimum
age requirement for consent to abortion, reducing the need for a legal one." Id.
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emotional maturity necessary for wise resolution of the contraception decision.75 In any event, broad factual determinations
concerning the capacity of minors as a class is arguably best left
to the legislature, with its superior ability to resolve such questions of fact. Little justification appears for the court's substitution in the present case of its own judgment on this broad question of fact for that of the legislature."This is especially true in
light of the ipse dixit fashion in which the court asserted its
factual conclusion.

B. Alternative Standards of Judicial Scrutiny
If minors lack sufficient capacity to exercise properly the
right of access to contraceptives absent adult guidance, the
court's recognition of such a right as fundamental appears erroneous. That recognition places the court in the tenuous position
of asserting that a significant class is possessed of a fundamental
right it is ill-equipped to handle. Further, since the curtailment
of a fundamental right triggers application of a strict or compelling state interest standard of judicial scrutiny,77the court's use
of that rigorous standard in the present case is necessarily unwarranted.
75. Whether a minor is physically capable of sexual reproduction or not in other
contexts appears to be wholly irrelevant if emotional maturity is not found. See, e.g.,
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), where a minor was denied the privilege to
purchase pornography because of its allegedly harmful impact on him. A minor is not
permitted to enter certain movies for the same reason. See, e.g., Note, "For Adults Only ":
The Constitutionality of Governmental Film Censorship by Age Classification, 69 YALE
L.J. 141 (1959).
76. The decision involves exceedingly complex social problems which the court is
simply ill-equipped to assess and determine. Such questions deserve thorough empirical
studies and evaluations which the legislature is best equipped to make. See note 78 infra.
Assumptions need to be tested. One implicit assumption which the court indulges in
is that free access to contraceptives will effect a significant curtailment of illegitimacies.
Factors which would tend to undermine that assumption are the sporadic and unplanned
nature of teenage sexual activity, ignorance of birth control methods, inadequate motivaSERVICES,
1970
tion to use the available devices (see, e.g., STATEOF UTAHDEP'TOF SOCIAL
ANNUAL
REPORTOF UTAHVITALSTATISTICS
30 (1973) (indicating that even adult women in
Utah bearing illegitimate children could have avoided pregnancy by availing themselves
of the contraceptive services offered)), failure of the devices through improper application
or continuation, and increases in sexual activity. See Westoff, Coital Frequency and
PUNNING
PERSPECTIVES
136,141 (1974) (documenting an increase
Contraceptives, 6 FAMILY
in intercourse among married people using contraceptives of approximately 14 percent in
corrected figures).
On the other hand, certain costs to society need to be evaluated, such as the possible
effects of free access to contraceptives on promiscuity among minors, venereal disease, and
family solidarity. Such problems do not lend themselves to fascile determination. The
legislature could well determine that the social costs far outweigh the possible benefits.
77. See note 28 supra.
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Rather than apply the rigorous and interventionist compelling state interest standard,7Rstrong arguments appear that the
court should have applied a Ginsberg-type rational basis test.
Ginsberg v. New Y ~ r allows
k ~ ~ a state to protect its children from
their own incapacity, even though state-imposed limitations may
infringe on what otherwise are "protected areas" of minors'
rights? The Court stated that the "well-being of children is of
78. Upon a court's decision that an interest may be abridged only by a "compelling
state interest," the court has essentially determined that the particular interest must
prevail. One commentator has noted that the standard imposes such a severe burden of
justification on the state as to be a "statement of a conclusion rather than a measure of
constitutionality. The issue in those cases is resolved in the determination whether a
fundamental interest is adversely affected." Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory
Education, and the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 213, 232
(1973). See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV.L. REV.1065
(1969). Chief Justice Burger similarly noted:
Some lines must be drawn. To challenge such lines by the "compelling state
interest" standard is to condemn them all. So far as I am aware, no state law
has ever satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever
will, for it demands nothing less than perfection.
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
The imposition of a compelling interest standard in the instant case substituted the
court's judgment for that of the legislature. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, long adverse to an
interventionist stand by the courts, would repose that responsibility with the legislature
when competing interests are involved:
How are competing interests to be assessed? Since they are not subject to
quantitative ascertainment, the issue necessarily resolves itself into asking, who
is to make the adjustments? . . . Full responsibility for the choice cannot be
given to the courts. Courts are not representative bodies. . . . Their judgment
is best informed, and therefore most dependable, within narrow limits. Their
essential quality is detachment, founded on independence. History teaches us
that the independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions of the day and assume primary responsibility in choosing
between competing political, economic and social pressures.
Primary responsibility for adjusting the interests which compete in the
situation before us of necessity belongs to the Congress. . . . We are to set aside
the judgments of those whose duty it is to legislate only if there is no reasonable
basis for it.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (concurring opinion).
79. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
80. See notes 59-64 and accompanying text supra. It is clear in the present context
that a state may protect its youth from what it deems morally undesirable elements. In
Miller u. California, the Court "recognized t h a t the States have a legitimate interest in
prohibiting dissemination of obscene material when the mode of dissemination carries
with it a significant danger . . . of exposure to juveniles." 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973).
Justice Harlan, dissenting in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (1961), argued that a
state does have an interest in the moral welfare of its citizenry:
The laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual powers may
be used and the legal and societal context in which children are born and
brought up, as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual
practices which express the negative of the proposition, confining sexuality to
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course a subject within the State's power to reg~late,"~'
and "two
interests justify the limitations" on minor's activities. First,
"constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that
the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct
the rearing of their children is basic to the structure of our society." Thus, the "legislature could properly conclude that parents and others . . . who have this primary responsibility for
children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed
to aid discharge of that re~ponsibility."~~
Second, the "State also
has an independent interest in the well-being of its youth."s3 The
Court stated that, in view of these interests, to exclude the material required only "that we be able to say it was not irrational for
the legislature to find that exposure to material condemned by
the statute is harmful to minors."s4 Further, in the application of
this "not irrational" standard, the state's position was not hindered by lack of proof of the assumptions underlying the stateimposed restrictions since the Court would not demand "scientifically certain criteria of legi~lation."~~
The instant case involves interests and rights similar, if not
identical, to those considered in Ginsberg: a state interest in the
well-being of its youth and in parents' rights to direct the upbringing of their children poised against the minor's assertedly
unqualified right to engage in certain a c t i v i t i e ~Both
. ~ ~ cases in-

-

-

-

-

--

--

-

lawful marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our
social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that
basis.
81. 390 U S . a t 639.
82. Id.
83. Id. a t 640.
84. Id. a t 641.
85. Id. a t 643.
86. Of course, parental rights and minors' best interests ideally will coincide. Yet
even if those interests are not in every instance served by parental choices, the child
ultimately shares an interest in preserving parental rights, as enforced by the state in the
instant case. One commentator has observed:
[Parental] interests are entitled to "specia1,safeguards" and may be so entwined in "[tlhe entire fabric of the Constitution" as to warrant ninth amendment protection. The parent even has a right to be wrong concerning the child's
best interests. As a constituent of the family, the child shares an interest in
preservation of that right, even if the parent is sometimes mistaken about optimal choices. Indeed, the explanation for the parental right is largely the intimacy of the family unit and the beneficial effects of the family on the child's
development.
Soifer, Parental Autonomy, Family Rights and t h e Illegitimate: A Constitutional
Commentary, 7 CONN.L. REV.1, 45 (1974) (emphasis added), quoting United States v.
Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495-96 (1965)
(Goldberg, J. concurring).
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volve incursions on "protected areas" of minors' rights for what
the state deems to be the best interests of the child. Also, both
cases involve state-created restrictions designed to aid parents in
the discharge of their responsibility to insure the well-being of
their children. Given this significant correlation between
Ginsberg and the present case, therefore, the standard of judicial
scrutiny articulated in the former appears wholly appropriate for
application in the latter. If the Ginsberg test were applied, Utah's
parental consent requirement would almost certainly be sustained. The reasoning underlying that requirement-that parental guidance in the contraception decision is necessary to both the
moral development of minors and protection of their health-87 is
clearly not irrational. Even if the state's reasoning admits of no
87. The state may have felt, in view of an appraisal of its citizenry, that parental
guidance and control of children's use of contraceptives would assure greater protection
and more personal supervision of contraceptive use. It is undeniable that the use of
contraceptives presents a growing health problem. One study based on California data
estimates that there are a t least 3,000 deaths of young women per year and 30,000 serious
non-fatal illnesses from the use of oral contraceptives. H. WILLIAMS,
THEPILLIN NEW
PERSPECTIVE
16, 131-38 (1969). Some researchers have presented evidence that the death
rate from contraceptives is as high as from induced hospital abortions. B. SARVIS
& H.
RODMAN,
THEABORTION
CONTROVERSY
150 (1973). The birth control pill increases the risk
of thromboembolic disorders by nine times, according to one research team. Vessey & Doll,
Investigation o f Relation between Use of Oral Contraceptives and Thromboembolic
J., April 27, 1968, a t 199, 205. The official FDA study on oral
Disease, BRITISHMEDICAL
contraceptives lists the risk of complication from blood-clotting disorders as six times
greater among users than among nonusers. In addition, anyone with liver problems, breast
cancer, kidney disease, high blood pressure, diabetes, epilepsy, asthma, fibroids of the
uterus, migraine headaches or mental depressions are advised against the use of the pill
without expert medical supervision. For a detailed report on the effects of contraceptive
use see FDA, REPORT
ON ORAL
CONTRACEFTIVES
BY THE ADVISORY
COMM.
ON OBSTETRICS
AND
GYNECOLOGY
(1966). Other studies indicate correlations with gall bladder and gallstone
PLANproblems a t double the rate of nonusers. See Connell, The Pill Revisited, 7 FAMILY
NING PERSPECTIVES
62, 64-65 (1975) (also documenting the increased incidence of cardiac
and multiple congenital abnormalities of the VACTRL type (vertebral, anal, cardiac,
tracheoesophageal, renal and limb defects)). In addition, see Hormones Linked to Birth
Defects, 106 SCI. NEWS,Oct. 26, 1974, a t 261-62. See generally Note, Liability of Birth
Control Manufacturers, 23 HASTINGS
L.J. 1526 (1972).
The risks associated with other forms of contraceptives, e.g., the intra-uterine device
(IUD), are likewise not immune from controversy. See Drug Firm and FDA Suspend IUD
Sales, 106 SCI.NEWS,July 13, 1974, a t 22 (result of fatalities from device known as Dalkon
Shield). Although the risk is slight in relation to the magnitude of use, the parents'
interests may well be represented by one commentator's statement relating especially to
birth control pills:
After all, we are dealing with only a few deaths per hundred thousand users,
which does not sound like very much until your wife, lover, or daughter is the
one who dies from it, or until you take into account that many millions are now
swallowing it regularly and that the number of fatalities continues to rise.
THEGENETIC
FIX 168 (1973).
A. ETZIONI,
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categorical proof, under Ginsberg the lack of empirical certainty
provides no grounds for invalidation of the regulation^.^^

C. Parental Rights and State Interests
The most significant flaw in this decision arises from the
court's failure fully to recognize and vindicate both parental
rights of control and the state's interest in insuring the exercise
of those rights. Essentially, the court failed adequately to balance
parental rights and the state's concomitant interest against the
minor's newly recognized right of access to c o n t r a c e p t i ~ e s . ~ ~
Rather than engaging in a careful balancing process, the court
relied upon cases and statutes that demonstrate instances of state
encroachment on parental rights.'O These authorities, however,
are of doubtful applicability to the issues of the present case.
The court's authorities demonstrate that, in some contexts,
the state's interest in protecting minors outweighs parental
rights; in each context, a valid state interest prevails against the
parent. That result, however, does little or nothing to establish
that, when a conflict exists between parents' and minors' rights,
the latter must necessarily prevail. At most, the authorities cited
by the court demonstrate the fact that parental rights are not
absolute-leading only to the conclusion that the rights of parents must be carefully balanced one against the rights of children
when those rights unavoidably conflict. The fact that parental
rights are not unlimited does not, as the court appears to assume,
dictate the conclusion that the rights of children must prevail.
If the state and parental interests identified in the present
case were carefully balanced against a minor's right of access to
contraceptives, the former would almost certainly prevail. Although the right of privacy, the basis of the minor's claim, has
been accorded fundamental status, that fundamentality becomes
attenuated in areas where the application of the right itself is
88. See notes 61-63 and accompanying text supra. See also Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U S . 49, 52 (1973), wherein the Court states:
The fact that a congressional directive reflects unprovable assumptions about
what is good for the people, including imponderable aesthetic assumptions, is
not a sufficient reason to find that statute unconstitutional.
89. Before such a balancing test could occur, that right of access to contraceptives
would have to be recognized and extended to the minor, as was done in this case.
90. The court gives as examples of situations where "valid state interests" have
encroached upon parental rights: enforcement of compulsory education, regulating child
labor, preventing parental neglect, and providing for the general health. Jones, supra at
14.
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tenuous. Such an application arguably occurred in the instant
case. The court, without precedent, created in adults a right of
access to contraceptive^,^' then again without precedent and
seemingly in disregard of well-established concepts of capacity
extended that right to minors.g2On the other hand, parental
rights have consistently been accorded fundamental status.93Further, the state's Department of Social Services necessarily confronted the conflict between parental rights of control and the
interests of minors in unimpeded access to contraceptives when
it promulgated the regulations challenged in the instant case. It
opted for the former and included the parental consent requirement in the regulatory scheme. That decision, given the expertise
of the Department in the area, merits some, and perhaps substantial, deference.
Also, it appears that the court's failure to balance the competing interests involved must give rise to undesirable consequences. First, if the minor's asserted right of access to contraceptives can prevail over parental rights of control, a court will be
compelled, in order to avoid an untenable inconsistency, to sustain that right in the event a state-employed social worker, whose
judgment has been substituted for that of the parent, determines
that a child in a particular case should not receive contraceptives.
Thus, the state will be deprived of the opportunity to operate one
of its programs in a manner that, in its judgment, best insures
the well-being of program beneficiaries. Second, in apparent fear
that some parents, contrary to the seeming best interests of the
child, may unreasonably withhold consent from their children to
obtain contraceptives, the court wholly abrogated all parents'
rights of binding control in their child's contraception decision.
Such an abrogation seems no more justified than removing custody of children from all parents because of the possibility that
some parents may abuse or neglect their children.94A better solu91. See note 73 supra.
92. Although there is some lower court precedent wherein the minor's right of privacy
has been recognized, see note 66 supra, the Supreme Court has never recognized a right
of privacy in minors. See Note, Privacy Rights of Minors, supra note 16, at 1009; Note,
The Minor's Right to an Abortion and the Requirement of Parental Consent, 60 V A .L.
REV.305, 316-17 (1974).
93. See notes 32-34 and accompanying text supra.
94. Even in the cases where custody of the child is taken from neglectful or abusive
parents, there is continuing debate whether the child is better off under poor parents or
IN CHILD
WEI.FAHE
traditionally inept state agencies. See, e.g., THEKNOWNAND UNKNOWN
RESEARCH:
AN APPRAISAL
(M. Norris & B. Wallace eds. 1965); Soifer, Parental Autonomy.
Family Rights and the Illegitimate: A Constitutional Commentary, 7 CONN.L. REV.1
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tion, consonant with proper recognition of both children's and
parents' rights, would be a determination on a case-by-case basis
whether retention of parental consent is justified.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The court, without apparent needg5or constitutional justifia fundamental right of access to contraceptives
~ation,~%xtended
passim (1974); Symposium-The Relationship between Promise and Performance in
State Intervention in Family Life, 9 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC.PROB.28 passim (1972).
95. The court could have disposed of the case on two narrower grounds, although
neither passes without argument. First, the court could have disposed of the case on
supremacy clause grounds alone. For the dissent's rebuttal see note 65 supra. Second, it
could have disposed of the case on equal protection grounds, as did the United States
Supreme Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird, note 10 and accompanying text supra. While not
basing its decision on equal protection analysis, the Court mentioned that since the
requirement of parental consent explicitly applied only to indigent minors whose families
qualified for federal aid, the regulations would not withstand equal protection analysis.
The latter statement seems faulty on two grounds. First, the dissent argued that since
an indigent minor could obtain the same services with the requisite means, then the only
classification is based on wealth, which the Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 422 U.S. 1, 18-28 (1973) held not to be a suspect classification
and therefore not subject to the strict scrutiny applied in other contexts. Jones, supra,
dissent a t 15. Thus, the only test required was the deferential "reasonable basis" test that
was satisfied by the state's desire "not to be involved in the distribution of contraceptives
to minors." Id. This is reasonable, argued the dissent, because "state statutes condemn
sexual relations with minors" as well as fornication. Id. See UTAHCODEANN.§ 76-53-19
(sexual relations with a female under 18 years, with or without consent, is a felony) and §
76-53-5 (1953) (fornication classified as misdemeanor).
Second, although the statutes do not explicitly reach affluent minors, the Supreme
Court has recognized that the mere underinclusiveness of a statute is not grounds in itself
for invalidation. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955);
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937); Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell,
222 U.S. 225, 225-36 (1911). See generally Note, Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARV.L. REV.1065, 1084-87 (1969). This principle is pertinent, especially
in light of the fact that affluent minors by common law likewise appear to be precluded
from obtaining contraceptives without parental consent. Since an affluent minor could not
obtain contraceptives except through his physician, he would fall within the category of
"medical care," which the physician cannot legally administer without informed consent.
See note 38 supra. Since minors rich and poor lack the ability to give informed consent
absent specific exceptions equally applicable to rich and poor minors, notes 38-39 supra,
all minors are affected equally. Further, Utah statutes imply a general parental consent
requirement by specifically excusing the requirement in the treatment of a minor's venereal disease. UTAHCODEANN.5 26-6-39.1 (Supp. 1973). Other statutes specifically enforce
parental consent requirements. See, e.g., UTAHCODEANN. 76-7-304(4) (Supp. 1973)
(requiring parental consent for single minor girls to procure abortions) and 5 30-1-2 (1969)
(requiring parental consent for males under 16 and females under 14 to marry). Other
statutes express legislative opprobrium of teenage sexual activity. See, e.g., UTAHCODE
ANN.§ 50-19-9 (Supp. 1973) (prohibiting sale of "prophylactics" to persons under 18).
96. According to long-recognized canons of constitutional interpretation, a court
should dispose of the case on the narrowest possible grounds. Instead of disposing of the
case on either the supremacy clause or equal protection grounds, the court continued to
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to minors which it implicitly recognized the minor is ill-equipped
to exercise. In doing so, the court failed to recognize longstanding
parental rights and the state's interest in reinforcing those rights
as interests against which the minors' nascent rights should have
been balanced. In view of the foregoing, extension of the right of
access to contraceptives to minors in the instant case appears to
have been unjustified.
the right of privacy, recognizing an unprecedented fundamental right of access to contraceptives both in adults and minors. The disposition of the case is thus in contrast with
accepted rules of constitutional interpretation. Justice Brandeis laid out, in Ashwander
v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288,346-48 (1936) (concurring), a series of rules "for its own governance,"
which were subsequently followed by the Supreme Court in deciding constitutional issues.
Among the rules are that the Court will not "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied," quoting Liverpool, N.Y.
& Phila. Steamship Co. v. Emigration Comm'rs, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885), and that "the
Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show
that he is injured by its operation." Accord, Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S.
549 (1947) and Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,503 (1961) (Court will not adjudicate constitutional issues unless unavoidable). The plaintiff in the instant case did not show that she
was injured by the operation of the regulations. She was not denied contraceptives because
she could not obtain parental consent, but because she refused to do so. Jones, supra at
2.

